A Theory of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Accountable and Independent Judiciary

  • K. D. Ewing

Abstract

This article explores how the judiciary, particularly in the modern British context, could increase its representational capacity and its accountability while maintaining its independence. The analysis includes an examination of the functions and principles underlying the judiciary, as well as the current movement for judicial reform in Britain. The author suggests a number of ways for judges to be made accountable in order to promote dialogue between judges and the public, including the appearance before a Select Committee. It is also suggested that a Registrar of Judicial Interests would strengthen both judicial independence and accountability. The author further notes that the creation of a Judicial Appointments Commission, not only to monitor but also to appoint judges, would protect the judiciary's independence from the political sphere.
How to Cite
Ewing, K. D. (1). A Theory of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Accountable and Independent Judiciary. Alberta Law Review, 38(3), 708. https://doi.org/10.29173/alr1430